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LIMITING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN ONGOING
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
As administrative agencies have grown in number and complexity, so have the problems of articulating the point at which federal courts are empowered or required to intervene in administrative agency proceedings. This Comment focuses upon one device
-the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies-that seeks
to define the respective roles of the courts and the agencies in the
administrative process and to ease the tensions between these two
centers of authority. The exhaustion requirement, generally
stated, prevents a party from obtaining judicial relief from agency
action until all the prescribed administrative remedies are first resorted to.1 Among other things, this discretionary and self-imposed
rule prevents the courts, by premature intervention, from hampering the efficiency of the administrative process. 2 The courts, however, have introduced several exceptions to the exhaustion requirement that allow them to intervene in ongoing agency proceedings
under certain circumstances.
This Comment examines the exhaustion doctrine in light of
its fundamental purposes and concludes that the doctrine fails to
achieve those goals. Owing to its highly discretionary and amorphous nature, the exhaustion requirement not only allows courts
to interfere with agency action on an ad hoc basis 3-undermining
administrative authority-but more importantly, it encourages disgruntled parties to circumvent established agency procedures
through judicial intervention. In either case, exhaustion, as it has
been developed, operates to erode the congressionally mandated administrative process.
After describing the contours of the exhaustion doctrine and
its exceptions in part I, the Comment will go on, in part II, to dis§§ 20.01-.08
1 See generally K. DAvis, ADMnNisTRrA=v LAw OF THE SE ENrs
(1976); L. JAFF., JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 424-58 (1965);
Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L.J. 981 (1939); Fuchs,
Prerequisites to Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action, 51 IND. L.J.
859 (1976); Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFFALO L.
R v. 327 (1963); Zacharias, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies-A Synthesis
of the Law and a Proposed Statute for Federal Prison Cases, 4 N. ENG. J. PRISON L.
5 (1977); Comment, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 39 CORELL L.Q.
273 (1954); Note, The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 18
WAYNE L. Rxv. 1403 (1972).
2 McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
35 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 49.02 (1980);
see notes 16-62 infra & accompanying text.
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cuss the use of the "final agency action" limitation on judicial review of agency proceedings found in section 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).4 The Comment evaluates two judicial approaches to finality-those of Judges Friendly and Leventhal-concluding that the utility of section 10(c) for preserving the
integrity of the administrative process turns upon interpreting
finality as a limit on federal court jurisdiction to review ongoing
agency proceedings. Part III continues the discussion of finality
by offering a definition of final agency action that attempts to
further the underlying purpose of the exhaustion rule. This definidon isolates two indicia of final agency action-directness and externality of effects-that, when present, will satisfy the jurisdictional
prerequisite to judicial intervention. The Comment also proposes
to replace the few necessary exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine
with the traditionally narrow mandamus jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
A jurisdictional definition of finality, such as is proposed by
this Comment, coupled with the use of the federal mandamus
power, can avoid unwarranted disruptions of ongoing administrative proceedings by providing the courts with a clear and precise
standard for determining when intervention is appropriate. The
theory advocated has the additional advantage of discouraging
parties before agencies from attempting to skirt proper agency procedures, thereby preserving the effectiveness and independence of
administrative decisionmaking.

I. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
A. Definition and Purpose
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the
universally recognized bar to a petitioner seeking equitable relief
from agency action prior to the completion of administrative proceedings.5 This "long-settled rule of judicial administration" provides that "no one is entitled to judicial relief from a supposed
or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy
has been exhausted." 6 Due largely to its genesis as an equitable
45 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).

See text accompanying note 65 infra.

n See note I supra & accompanying text.
6 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (footnote
omitted).

The "judicial relief'

spoken of here refers primarily to suits for

injunctive relief in federal district court.
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principle,7 exercise of the exhaustion rule is generally viewed as a
matter within a court's discretion and does not bear upon the court's
jurisdiction."
The courts have fashioned the exhaustion requirement to fulfill several purposes, all of which are related to the fundamental
notion that administrative agencies are entitled to a certain degree
of judicial deference. In McKart v. United States, for example,
the Supreme Court stated that "[a] primary purpose [of the exhaustion doctrine] is ...the avoidance of premature interruption of the
administrative process." 9 Principal among the reasons that the
Court gave for wanting to avoid such an "interruption" were to let
the agency develop a factual record; to allow the agency the first
chance to exercise its discretion and/or expertise; and to avoid
hampering the efficiency of the administrative process through
piecemeal judicial review. 10 Each of these reasons might be suf7The exhaustion rule evolved as a corollary to the principle that equity would
not intervene when there existed an adequate remedy at law. See Berger, supra
note 1, at 983; Comment, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 39 CORNELL
L.Q. 273, 274-75 (1954).
Cf. Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Sackheim, 451
F. Supp. 1181, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (the exhaustion doctrine has been interpreted
as "reflecting equity's reluctance to intervene when the law provides an adequate
remedy").
8 Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. HUirsh, 331 U.S. 752, 764 (1947); South
Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1192 n.1 (8th Cir. 1980); Montgomery v.
Rumsfield, 572 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1978); Dry Creek Lodge v. United States,
515 F.2d 926, 933 n.7 (10th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Tobias v. Laird, 413
F.2d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1969); Turner v. Callaway, 371 F. Supp. 188, 192
(D.D.C. 1974); Patterson v. Stancliff, 330 F. Supp. 110, 112-13 (D. Va. 1971).
That the exhaustion doctrine operates solely upon a discretionary level appears
to be accepted by most American courts. Until recently, however, the Ninth
Circuit regarded the doctrine as a limit on the jurisdiction of the court. See Hills
v. Eisenhart, 256 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1958); Herriges v. United States, 314
F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (D. Mont. 1970); United States v. Bradt, 280 F. Supp. 858,
859 (C.D. Cal. 1968). That approach has since been modified, and a distinction
is now drawn by the Ninth Circuit between cases in which the exhaustion requirement is statutorily mandated and cases in which no such mandate applies. In the
latter category, the jurisdictional view has been rejected. See Eluska v. Andrus, 587
F.2d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 1978); Montgomery v. Rumsfield, 572 F.2d at 252-53.
9 McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
See also Weinberger
v. Safi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690,
695 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1020 (1980); Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1971); K. DAvis, ADMnrswTRATIvE LAW TEXT
§ 20.02, at 385-86 (3d ed. 1972); 5 B. MEZINES, J. Swaxm & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATrvE LAw § 49.01 (1980).
10395 U.S. at 194. See also Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972)
(stating that the doctrine's "basic purpose . . . is to allow an administrative agency
to perform functions within its special competence-to make a factual record, to
apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies"); Weinberger v. Safi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); National Conservative
Pol. Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 626 F.2d 953, 957 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Murillo v. Mathews, 588 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1978); Hayes v. Secretary
of Defense, 515 F.2d 668, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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ficient to justify a rule preventing judicial intervention. Together,
however, they form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. For
all of the rationales display an underlying interest in preserving
the administrative process as an effective and independent means of
adjudication and regulation. This implies that administrative proceedings as such deserve not to be interrupted by the courts, absent
some very pressing contrary interest. Indeed, the McKart Court
went on to say that
[c]losely related to [these]

. . .

reasons is a notion peculiar

to administrative law. The administrative agency is
created as a separate entity and invested with certain
powers and duties. The courts ordinarily should not interfere with an agency until it has completed its action, or
else has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. . . . "[t]he exhaustion doctrine is, therefore, an expression of executive
and administrative autonomy." -"
Furthermore, the Court found reasons for requiring exhaustion that, it said, "have nothing to do with the dangers of interruption of the administrative process." 12 One of these reasons, based
upon "very practical notions of judicial efficiency," requires a litigant to vindicate her rights within the administrative process, if
possible, to conserve judicial resources.' 3 In addition, said the
Court, "notions of administrative autonomy require that the
agency be given a chance to discover and correct its own errors." 14
Also, the Court shunned the "possib[ility] that frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative processes could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures." '1 This last point is of particular importance because it
11 McKart, 395 U.S. at 194 (footnote omitted).
-1 Id. 194-95. Why these reasons "have nothing to do with" the policy against
intervention in administrative proceedings is far from clear. Rather, they appear
to be reasons that actually support that policy, inasmuch as all are factors militating
against interruption. Perhaps the Court meant to distinguish these reasons on the

ground that they apply even when resort to administrative procedures is no longer
possible. This would make sense in light of the particular facts of McKart. See
id. 194.
13395 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 579 F.2d
1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 1978) (the exhaustion requirement avoids collateral, dilatory
action and ensures efficient, uninterrupted progression of administrative proceedings
and effective application of judicial review).
14395 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added). See L. JAFFE, Ju IrAx CONTROL OF
ADnsTrrvE ACTION 425 (1965).
'5 395 U.S. at 195 (emphasis added). See McGee v. United States, 402 U.S.
479, 484 (1971) (quoting McKart, 395 U.S. at 195). Cf. Sheehan v. Secretary of

HEW, 593 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir. 1979) ("harsh result" justified by "necessity to

maintain orderly review [that] requires compliance with orderly procedures").
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emphasizes that rules governing the timing of judicial review of
agency decisions should not be so vague or lax as to give litigants
incentive to challenge agencies at every turn. While judicial efficiency may certainly be promoted by a rule encouraging parties
to settle their differences in an administrative forum, the Court
seems equally, if not primarily, concerned with promoting the
integrity of the administrative process. Whether the exhaustion
rule is justified by concern for administrative "integrity" or with
conserving judicial and administrative resources, however, the result is the same: the courts should refrain in most cases from intervening in administrative proceedings. Not only does interruption
disturb the decisionmaking authority of the administrative process
by eroding its autonomy, but also the mere fact that proceedings are
interrupted has a jarring effect upon the efficiency of both agencies
and courts-regardless of the ultimate outcome. Evidently, it was
in order to avoid these problems that the courts introduced the
exhaustion doctrine.
B. Exceptions
As a discretionary principle, the exhaustion doctrine is not
an absolute bar to judicial review of ongoing administrative proceedings, despite the strong policies favoring nonintervention.
The courts have not applied exhaustion mechanically," often making decisions whether to require exhaustion "seemingly influenced
by considerations other than those that strictly relate to exhaustion." '7 This flexible judicial approach has resulted in several
common, and some less common, exceptions to the exhaustion re8

quirement.1

16 NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 426 n.8 (1968)
("exhaustion is a matter within the sound discretion of the courts"); McGee, 402
U.S. at 485 (application of the doctrine "should be assessed in light of a discrete
analysis of the particular default in question, to see whether there is 'a governmental interest compelling enough' to justify the forfeiting of judicial review")
(quoting McKart, 395 U.S. at 197); Montgomery v. Rumsfield, 572 F.2d 250, 253
(9th Cir. 1978) (judicially developed exhaustion requirements are inherently
susceptible to judicial refinement and modification); Neely v. United States, 285
F.2d 438, 443 (Ct. Cl. 1961) ("unless made a prerequisite to suit by statute,
binding regulation or contract, the extent to which a plaintiff is required to pursue

his administrative remedy is a matter for the discretion of the court") (citations
omitted). But see Hills v. Eisenhart, 256 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 832 (1958); Herriges v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 1352, 1354 (D.
Mont. 1970) (failure to exhaust denies jurisdiction to the federal courts).
'7

K. DAvis,

ADMNISTRATIVE LAW OF Tl

SEVENTIES

§20.01 (1976).

'8 McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969). See Rhodes v. United
States, 574 F.2d 1179, 1181 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) ("undertaking to enumerate a
complete list [of exceptions] presents a more difficult challenge because of a lack
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There is, however, a fundamental tension between certain of
the policies supporting the exhaustion rule and the wide degree
of judicial discretion represented by the many exceptions to the
rule. Whereas the exhaustion requirement prevents the courts
from violating the integrity of the administrative process, the exceptions to the doctrine threaten to erode that protection beyond
repair. It is beyond dispute, however, that occasions arise during
the course of administrative proceedings that cry out for judicial
review. Such occasions no doubt account for the emergence of the
exhaustion exceptions in the first place. The crucial question is
how the balance between the competing interests is to be struck.
Whenever the courts intervene in ongoing administrative
proceedings, the administrative process may be disrupted in two
ways. The first of these is somewhat subtle, in that it relates to
notions of authority and stature. When an intervening court decides adversely to an administrative agency, the decision will inevitably-if incrementally-undermine the agency's decisionmaking
authority. The mere fact that the court may be correct and the
agency wrong does not necessarily justify the court's interference
in the administrative process. The agency's internal appeal mechanisms could still vindicate the party seeking review in the courts.
Furthermore, subsequent levels of agency review may develop
facts and reveal circumstances that change drastically the status
of the case. The fact remains, however, that judicial intervention
reduces the stature and legitimacy of the administrative process,
particularly in the eyes of those who must interact with it. Not
only is this lamentable as such, but it also further encourages litigants to by-pass or evade agency decisionmaking.
The administrative process is disturbed in a second way by
judicial intervention. Regardless of whether or not the court
ultimately reverses the agency decision, the bare fact that the proceedings are halted long enough for the parties to battle in court
will invariably disrupt the agency's business. Even if the move to
court is at bottom unjustified, court, agency and party time will
have to be spent determining, at least, whether the claim falls
within one of the exhaustion exceptions. More time may be spent
appealing a decision believed adverse. The existence of broad and
ambiguous exceptions to the exhaustion requirement can only
encourage disgruntled litigants before administrative agencies to
of consistency among reported cases"); K. DAvis, ADnimISTA
AEL-W OF
SEvEENrs § 20.01, at 446 (1976) ("The common judicial statement that one must
exhaust administrative remedies before going to court is false almost as often as
it is true.").
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seek judicial review before the conclusion of formal proceedings.
Obviously, the broader and less definite the dimensions of the
exception, the more opportunities exist for a litigant to argue that
her case falls within it, as well as for the court to find that it can
take the case. Each such case "weaken[s] the effectiveness of an
agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures," 19 thereby
disserving the policies underlying exhaustion.
The following sections canvass the exceptions to exhaustion
developed by the courts and describe how they may unacceptably
interfere with the integrity of the administrative system.
1. The Jurisdictional Exception
One often-invoked exception 20 to the exhaustion rule involves
challenges to an agency's jurisdiction. This exception was first suggested by the Supreme Court in Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United
States 21 and later confirmed in Leedom v. Kyne.22 Leedom per'9 MeKart, 395 U.S. at 195. The dearth of cases inwhich the courts actually
reach the merits of a claim, rather than dismiss for failure to exhaust, do not
undermine this argument. The point is made simply by reference to the innumerable cases in which parties to agency proceedings have sought review. The
fact that many or most courts exercise their discretion to turn back such cases
would indicate only that these intervention requests lack sufficient merit or basis to
justify20 judicial intervention.
Professor Davis has speculated that "[p]erhaps half of all exhaustion problems on which courts write opinions involve attempts to challenge the jurisdiction of
an agency in advance of completion of an administrative proceeding." K. DAvis,
AnmiSTRTnvE LAw TEXT §20.02 (3d ed. 1972).
21249 U.S. 557 (1919).
22 358 U.S. 184 (1958). In Leedom, the NLRB certified a bargaining unit
composed of both professional and nonprofessional employees. This certification
was not preceded by an election to ascertain whether the professional employees
favored including the nonprofessionals in their unit, although such an election was
expressly required by § 9(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(b)(1) (1976).
The Board ordered an election to determine which of two competing unions
would represent the unit, and one of those unions moved the Board to stay the
election and exclude the nonprofessionals. The Board refused and held the
election. The union then filed suit in district court, seeking to set aside
the Board's action. The Board moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, but the
district court, finding that the Board had improperly commingled employees, granted
the union's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals, rejecting the
Board's jurisdictional argument, affirmed. 249 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Before the Supreme Court, the Board contended that a certification order was
uureviewable except as it might bear on an unfair labor practice enforcement proceeding. This position seemed logical in light of the Court's holding in American
Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940), that a certification order was
not "final" and so did not vest the Court with jurisdiction to review the case. It
also comported with language in § 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 159 (1976). The Court disagreed with these arguments and held that
the district court had jurisdiction because the suit was
not one to "review," in the sense of that term as used in the Act, a

decision of the Board made within its jurisdiction. Rather it is one to
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mits a court to intervene in administrative proceedings if the
3
agency has exceeded its jurisdictional limits. The Supreme Court 2

and most lower courts 24 have construed the Leedom exception
narrowly. This narrow exception, "rarely successfully invoked," '
has been correctly used by federal courts "to check-not to supplant
-administrative action." 26
An alternative approach to challenges to an agency's jurisdiction, however, threatens to expand the narrow Leedom interpretation and consequently permit increased judicial interruption of
ongoing agency proceedings. This approach, initially advocated
by Professor Davis, 27 has since been adopted by the Ninth Circuit. 28
Under this approach, the question whether a court should intervene to determine whether an agency has jurisdiction over a given
case turns on an assessment of three factors: the extent to which
the parties will be injured if forced to pursue their administrative
remedies; the degree of clarity or, doubt about agency jurisdiction;
and the need for administrative expertise in resolving the jurisdictional issue. 29 Professor Davis has acknowledged that an evaluation
strike down an order of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers
and contrary to a specific prohibition in the Act.
358 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added).
23
Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964).
24
American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 496 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1974) (jurisdictional violation must be "gross or egregious"); United States v. Feaster, 410
F.2d 1354, 1368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 962 (1969) (jurisdictional
violation must be "egregious"); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Fowler, 261 F. Supp.
508, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("palpably unconstitutional"). But see text accompanying notes 67-153 infra.
25 United States v. Feaster, 410 F.2d 1354, 1368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 962 (1969).
rv26 FiL
RiEPORT OF THE ATroRNEY GENERAL's CommTrrE oN AD.Nsrsu
PROCEDURE 77 (1941) (emphasis in original).
273 K. DAvis, ADmnmTRSArvE LAW TREATISE § 20.03 (1958).
28
Casey v. FTC, 578 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1978); California ex rel.
Christensen v. FTC, 549 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 876
(1977); Lone Star Cement Corp. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 505, 510 (9th Cir. 1964).
The continued vitality of the Davis approach to jurisdictional claims in the Ninth
Circuit was drawn into question by Marshall v. Burlington N., Inc., 595 F.2d 511,
513 (9th Cir. 1979). See note 29 infra.
No other circuit has adopted the Davis approach. It has not, however, gone
unnoticed elsewhere. The Fifth Circuit applied the Davis test in Frito-Lay, Inc. v.
FTC, 380 F.2d 8, 10 (5th Cir. 1967). Accord, Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.
v. EPA, 587 F.2d 549, 563 (2d Cir. 1978) (Feinberg, J., concurring); Bailey v.
United States, 451 F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1971) (Clark, J., dissenting).
29K. DAvis, ADxMISTRATIE LAW TEXT § 20.03 (3d ed. 1972). It is open to
question whether a recent Ninth Circuit decision has altered the status of the
Davis approach in that circuit. Citing Casey, California ex rel. Christensen, Lone
Star Cement, and the Davis treatise, the court restated its approach to agency
jurisdictional challenges as follows:
Judicial intervention prior to an agency's initial determination of its
jurisdiction is appropriate only where: (1) there is clear evidence that
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of these factors involves a large element of judgment, and that a
"workable standard probably should not go beyond a statement that
each of these factors should be weighed in determining whether
or not a court should decide an issue of administrative jurisdiction
without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies." 30
The Davis approach represents a substantial departure from
the narrow Leedom exception. The focus of the Leedom line of
cases is on whether an agency clearly lacks jurisdiction. If the
pleadings do not make clear that the agency has exceeded its statutory mandate, Leedom requires exhaustion. In contrast, the Davis
approach requires, at least, limited judicial intervention to consider problematic claims of jurisdiction. If an agency's jurisdiction
is brought into question, a court must consider the propriety of
intervention in light of the three articulated factors. 31 Because a
thorough consideration of these three factors undoubtedly involves
some consideration of the merits of a case, such an approach encourages, rather than discourages, judicial intervention in ongoing
agency proceedings.
2. The Constitutional Exception
Another exception to the exhaustion requirement arises when
agency action allegedly violates a litigant's constitutional rights.
The Second Circuit proposed this exception in Fay v. Douds: 32
"If this assertion of constitutional rights is not transparently frivexhaustion of administrative remedies will result in irreparable injury;
(2) the agency's jurisdiction is plainly lacking; and (3) the agency's spe-

cial expertise will be of no help on the question of its jurisdiction.
Marshall v. Burlington N., Inc., 595 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis
added). The Marshall analysis, if followed literally, would eviscerate Davis's discretionary approach.

Moreover, it would actually impose a more formidable bar-

rier to judicial consideration of jurisdictional claims than the Leedom line of cases
presently imposes. Under Leedom, judicial consideration is warranted when agency
jurisdiction is plainly lacking.

See notes 20-26 supra & accompanying text.

Under

Marshall, however, there is an additional requirement that there be clear evidence
that exhaustion will cause irreparable injury.
30K. DAv-s, ADimINsTA=w LAw TEX- § 20.03 (3d ed. 1972).
3

1See text accompanying note 29 supra.
32 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949).
In Fay, the plaintiff labor union brought an action in district court to enjoin
an NLRB election that, with the employer's consent, involved a rival union. The
plaintiff also sought to compel the Board to hold an evidentiary hearing on its
complaint. The district judge dismissed the complaint. 79 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y.
1948).

On appeal, the plaintiff union contended that it possessed a "property right"

in maintaining its position as the involved employees' exclusive bargaining agent,
and that the Board's refusal to hold a hearing denied that right without due process
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olous, it gave the District Court jurisdiction; and, having once
acquired jurisdiction, the court might, and should, dispose of all
other questions which arose, even though they would not have been
independently justiciable." 33 Although the courts of appeals seem
to be retreating from Fay,34 the exhaustion exception for constituof law. It was this contention that, according to the Second Circuit, gave the
district court jurisdiction to hear the case. 172 F.2d at 723.
Note that Fay did not involve an exhaustion question; the Board's denial of
a hearing exhausted the union's only available remedy. It is, therefore, remarkable
that Fay stands for the proposition that agency action potentially infringing constitutional rights excuses plaintiffs from the exhaustion requirement.
33 172 F.2d at 723 (footnote omitted).
34 Second Circuit: see Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 565 F.2d 237,
239 (2d Cir. 1977) (mentioning constitutional rights solely in the context of appealing nonfinal orders, but concluding that there were "no administrative remedies
available to appellant . . . . Appellant had, therefore, exhausted its administrative remedies when it filed suit." Thus, the discussion of Fay appears to be dicta.);
Herald Co. v. Vincent, 392 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1968) (refusing to decide
whether Fay is still authoritative); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 375 F.2d 129,
134 (2d Cir. 1967) (same). See aiso Moshlak v. American Broadcasting Co., 423
F. Supp. 774, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (expressing doubt about Fay's viability in the
Second Circuit).
Third Circuit: see NLRB v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 610 F.2d 99, 107
(3d Cir. 1979) (Fay "has never been approved by the Supreme Court, and has
shown little growth potential, either in the Second Circuit . . . or elsewhere");
United States Metal Co. Employees' Ass'n v. NLRB, 478 F. Supp. 861, 864
(W.D. Pa. 1979) (Third Circuit has not accepted Fay); National Maritime Union
v. NLRB, 375 F. Supp. 421, 435 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mere., 506 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (same).
Fourth Circuit: see J.P. Stevens Employees Educ. Comm. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d
326, 329 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding Fay unpersuasive).
Fifth Circuit: see Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, 475 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Fay is "probably correct," but it has only limited application); Boire v. Miami
Herald Publishing Co., 343 F.2d 17, 21 n.7 (5th Cir. 1965) (questioning whether
Fay has been accepted by the Fifth Circuit).
Sixth Circuit: see Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. NLBB, 609 F.2d 240, 244-45
(6th Cir. 1979) (rejecting Fay).
Seventh Circuit: see Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5, 9 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977) (If still viable, Fay applies only to "a vested property right with respect to a collective bargaining agreement where he has no
way of ultimately obtaining judicial review."); Maremont Corp. v. FTC, 431 F.2d
124, 128 (7th Cir. 1970) (constitutional claim should be raised after completion of agency proceedings); American Auto. Ass'n v. Squillacote, 310 F. Supp.
596, 598-99 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (distinguishing Fay, but recognizing that its wisdom has been questioned).
Eighth Circuit: see Meat Cutters Local 576 v. Allen, 423 F.2d 267, 269 (8th
Cir. 1970) (refusing to decide the viability of Fay because plaintiff's constitutional
claim was "wholly frivolous"); Cihacek v. NLRB, 464 F. Supp. 940, 945 (D. Neb.
1979) (questioning Fay on the authority of Meat Cutters).
Ninth Circuit: see Squillacote v. Teamsters Local 344, 561 F.2d 31 (9th Cir.
1977) ("whatever is left of the Fay doctrine applies only to situations in which
the party seeking to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the district court asserts 'a
vested property right with respect to a collective bargaining agreement where
he has no way of ultimately obtaining judicial review"') (quoting Grutka v.
Barbour, 549 F.2d 5, 9 n.7 (7th Cir. 1977)), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977).
D.C. Circuit: see Wallace v. Lynn, 507 F.2d 1186, 1190-91, 1191 n.28 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (exhaustion doctrine applies to constitutional claim).
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tional claims is frequently mentioned in lower court decisions 35
and remains alive in the Supreme Court. 36
Courts applying Fay usually try to avoid disrupting the administrative process by requiring as a predicate to judicial intervention
something beyond a mere allegation that constitutional deprivations have occurred. 3 7 Some courts interpret the "not transparently
frivolous" 38 language of Fay to require a "substantial showing"
that a constitutional right has been abridged.39 Others insist that
the violation be "clear" or "very clear." 40
The problem with these seemingly narrow approaches is the
discretion a court has in assessing what constitutes a "clear" constitutional violation. This discretion enables a court to decide
that almost any alleged constitutional violation is serious enough
35 See, e.g., First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 697 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1020 (1980); Rosenthal & Co. v. Bagley, 581 F.2d
1258, 1261 (7th Cir. 1978); Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 565 F.2d
237, 239 (2d Cir. 1977); Seven-Up Co. v. FTC, 478 F.2d 755, 757 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1013 (1973); Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, 475 F.2d 299, 303
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 877 (1973); Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d
755, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Balanyi v. Local 1031, IBEW, 374 F.2d 723, 726 (7th
Cir. 1967).
36
In Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977), the Supreme Court stated:
Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing proceedings and, therefore, access to the courts is essential

to the decision of such questions ....

[W]hen constitutional questions

are in issue, the availability of judicial review is presumed, and we will
not read a statutory scheme to take the "extraordinary" step of foreclosing jurisdiction unless Congress' intent to do so is manifested by "clear
and convincing" evidence.
Id. 109. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (constitutional challenge heard
when beyond the agency's competence); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332
(1976) (considering a constitutional claim because agency resolution on nonconstitutional grounds "would not answer [the claimant's] constitutional challenge").
But see Weinberger v. Saffi, 422 U.S. 749, 762 (1975) (refusal to consider asserted constitutional violation because the constitutional claim had to be "brought
under jurisdictional grants contained in the [agency's enabling statute] and thus
in conformity with the same standards which are applicable to nonconstitutionaI
claims arising under the [statute]").
37
But cf. Downen v. Warner, 481 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Resolving
a claim founded solely on a constitutional right is singularly suited to a judicial
forum and clearly inappropriate to an administrative board.").
38
Fay, 172 F.2d at 723.
39 See, e.g., Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 565 F.2d 237, 239 (2d
Cir. 1977); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 496 F.2d 197, 199-200 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Feaster, 410 F.2d 1354, 1366 (5th Cir.) (quoting Boire,
343 F.2d at 21), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 962 (1969); Balanyi v. Local 1031, IBEW,
374 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1967) (citing Boire, 343 F.2d at 21); Mount Sinai
Hosp. v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 1099, 1120 (S.D. Fla. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 517 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
40
See, e.g., First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690, 696-97 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1020 (1980); Seven-Up Co. v. FTC, 478 F.2d
755, 757 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1013 (1973); Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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to require judicial resolution prior to the completion of agency
proceedings. 41 Perhaps more importantly, the mere presence of the
constitutional-issue exception may encourage parties to seek judicial review, although their claims may lack merit. The administrative process is no less interrupted by "fishing expeditions" as by
meritorious claims. Furthermore, the litigant who believes a constitutional violation has taken place will have, in either case, ultimate recourse to the courts. Consequently, litigants should not be
able to seek and obtain judicial intervention merely by claiming a
constitutional violation, except maybe in extraordinary circumstances.
3. Inadequate Remedies
A third exception, related to the preceding one, applies when
administrative remedies are inadequate or when litigants will suffer
irreparable injury if required to exhaust. Justice Rutledge's majority opinion in Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch42 was one of the
original formulations of this exception:
[T]he presence of constitutional questions, coupled with a
sufficient showing of inadequacy of prescribed administrative relief and of threatened or impending irreparable injury flowing from delay incident to following the prescribed procedure, has been held sufficient to dispense with
exhausting the administrative process before instituting
judicial intervention ....
[T]his rule is not one of mere
convenience or ready application . . . a strong showing is

required, both of inadequacy of the prescribed procedure
and of impending harm, to permit short-circuiting the ad43
ministrative process.
41

One court, addressing the "clearly illegal" standard, aptly expressed this
concern:
It may be argued that if administrative action is "clearly illegal"
and if in any event it will be overturned in the process of administrative
review, we should at the start save the parties the trouble and expense
of pursuing their administrative remedies. Again the simplicity of the
statement is deceiving....
In the realm of legal theory it may be that the phrase "clearly illegal" has a final and definite meaning but like so much other legal nomenclature when the time comes for application many difficulties are seen.
What appears clearly illegal to one judge may be on the fringe of legality to another; to another, unsavory administrative action, but nevertheless
the will of Congress.
Hardy v. Rossell, 135 F. Supp. 260, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (emphasis added).
42331 U.S. 752 (1947).
43 Id.773-74.
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Rutledge's narrow formulation of this exception requires both a
"strong showing" of inadequacy and irreparable injury, and claims
of a constitutional dimension, in order to avoid exhaustion. Many
courts have reformulated this exception, however, so that in most
cases either impending irreparable injury or inadequacy will excuse the exhaustion requirement for any claim.44 This reformulation obviously provides more opportunities for judicial intervention
in ongoing agency proceedings than does a strict construction of
Aircraft & Diesel Corp. because it significantly reduces the burden
upon the claimant.
4. International Questions
The Supreme Court announced the narrowest exception to
the exhaustion requirement in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros.45 In McCulloch, the Court excused the petitioner's
failure to exhaust on the theory that "the presence of public questions particularly high in the scale of our national interest because
of their international complexion is a uniquely compelling justification for prompt judicial resolution of the controversy over the
Board's power." 46 The Court noted that this exception was to be
extremely narrowly construed, 47 and it has rarely been used to
48
excuse the failure to exhaust.

44
E.g., Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 163 (1964) (no adequate
remedy); Von Hoffman v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633, 640-41 (5th Cir. 1980)
(futile or inadequate remedy); Rosenthal & Co. v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 614 F.2d 1121, 1128 (7th Cir. 1980) (irreparable injury); West v.
Bergland, 611 F.2d 710, 718-19 (8th Cir. 1979) (irreparable injury or inadequate remedy), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1980) (No. 791592); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1138 (3d Cir. 1979)
(exhaustion futile); Marine Wonderland & Animal Park v. Kreps, 610 F.2d 947,
949 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (irreparable injury); Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d
570, 577 (2d Cir. 1979) (exhaustion futile); Humana v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070,
1081 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (inefficacious remedy); Murillo v. Mathews, 588 F.2d
759, 763 (9th Cir. 1978) (fruitless); Rhodes v. United States, 574 F.2d 1179,
1181 (5th Cir. 1978) (no real opportunity for adequate relief); Sanders v. McCrady, 537 F.2d 1199 (4th Cir. 1976) (inadequate administrative remedy).
45372 U.S. 10 (1963). In McCulloch, the NLRB ordered a representation
election among foreign seamen on foreign ships owned by American corporate subsidiaries. The Court permitted immediate judicial intervention, noting that the
Board's action had aroused vigorous protests from foreign governments and had
created international problems for the United States.

46 Id. 17.

47 Specifically, the Court stated that McCulloch was "not to be taken as an
enlargement of the exception in [Leedom v.] Kyne." Id. See notes 20-25 supra
& accompanying text.
48
But see NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391
U.S. 418, 426 n.8 (1968) (union member not required to exhaust internal remedies when complaint raises a matter in "the public domain" and beyond union's
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5. Inherently Legal Questions
Another exhaustion exception of some import is invoked when
the issue with respect to which judicial review is sought is "purely"
or "inherently" legal. 49 Although one court recently stated that the
existence of a legal question "independently makes the exhaustion
doctrine inapplicable," 50 this exception "is in practice heavily
interwoven with other exceptions." 51 Because administrative
agencies frequently encounter "legal" issues in their proceedings,
allowing the mere existence of a legal issue to be an independent
basis for judicial intervention could effectively deny agencies the
opportunity to interpret the statutes they are authorized to apply.
In addition, difficulty in determining which issues are "purely" or
"inherently" legal may encourage litigants to seek review of otherwise unreviewable cases, by fostering the hope that the courts can
be persuaded to excuse exhaustion.
6. Waiver
Even when a case does not fit into one of the aforementioned
exhaustion exceptions, courts have some discretion to waive the
exhaustion requirement if the reasons for doing so are compelling.52 The recent Supreme Court decisions of Weinberger v.
Salfi N and Mathews v. Eldridge,5 rather than restricting this discretion, have made federal courts, administrative agencies, and
internal affairs); Chambers v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 375,
386 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (plurality opinion) (exhaustion not required when complaint raises a matter "in the public domain").
49
Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 1980-1 TBADE CAs.
It 63098 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 495 F.2d 785, 787 (7th
Cir. 1974); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 710-11 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Jewel Cos. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1970). But see McKart v.
United States, 395 U.S. 185, 205 (1969) (White, J., concurring); St. Regis Paper
Co. v. Marshall, 591 F.2d 612, 614 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979);
American Gen. Ins. Co. v. FTC, 496 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1974).
50
Dow Chem. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 459 F. Supp. 378, 388
(W.D. La. 1978) (emphasis added).
5
1 Zacharias, supra note 1, at 26.
52 See note 16 supra.
53422 U.S. 749 (1975).
54 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
The statute involved in Salt and Eldridge, 28 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976), requires a "final decision" prior to judicial review. The Court, however, interpreted
a final decision as "one in which the Secretary may specify such requirements for
exhaustion as he deems serve his own interests in effective and efficient administration." 422 U.S. at 766 (emphasis added). Because the Court is discussing
exhaustion requirements, its discussion is clearly relevant to the exhaustion doctrine
as such.
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parties to administrative proceedings increasingly uncertain about
when exhaustion of administrative remedies is required, when discretionary, and when unnecessary altogether.
In Weinberger v. Salfi, the Court held that the federal courts
are not entitled to assume jurisdiction absent a waiver by the administrative agency of the exhaustion requirement. A court could
not "substitute its [own] conclusion as to futility [of the administrative remedy] for the contrary conclusion of the Secretary." 55 The
Court, however, presumed agency waiver of exhaustion from the
fact that the agency did not "raise any challenge to the sufficiency
of the allegations of exhaustion in [the] . . . complaint." 6

Justice Brennan's dissent in Salfi pointed out several problems
with the Court's new formulation of the exhaustion doctrine. The
agency waiver requirement, according to Brennan, does not protect
the claimant's interest in avoiding futile remedies and presents opportunities for "lawless application" of the exhaustion doctrine
because an agency could choose at its whim whether to require
exhaustion. 57 Because the agency had moved in district court to
dismiss the entire action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
explicitly stating that no exhaustion had occurred, Justice Brennan
also criticized the Court's finding that the agency had waived
exhaustion.58
Justice Brennan's concern with "lawless application" of the
exhaustion doctrine was laid to rest in Mathews v. Eldridge. In
that case, an agency refused to waive the exhaustion requirement
and moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, under Salfi. 59
The Court rejected the agency's argument, interpreting Salfi as
having established two elements of exhaustion. The first or "nonwaivable" element-presenting a claim to the agency for administrative review-served as an absolute bar to judicial review. The
second or "waivable" element-exhausting the actual remedies prescribed by the agency-could be waived by the agency.60
The difficulty with Eldridge is that the Court assumed jurisdiction even though the "waivable element" of exhaustion was not
waived. Justice Powell's majority opinion explained this anomaly
on the ground that "cases may arise where a claimant's interest in
having a particular issue resolved promptly is so great that defer55 422 U.S. at 766.

56 Id. 767.
57 Id. 800-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58 Id. 801-02.
59 424 U.S. at 328.
6o Id. 328-32.
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ence to the agency's judgment [that exhaustion is required] is
inappropriate." 61
A serious problem with Salfi and Eldridge is that the application of the exhaustion doctrine, now depending on both an agency
and a court decision, has become even more unpredictable. The
agency has the right either to waive or not waive exhaustion, but
a federal court has the power, in its discretion, to effect a "waiver"
without the agency's consent and against its will. Stated in practical terms, the undesirable consequence of these two decisions is
that "the law that emerges is so complex that it cannot possibly
be administered by the lower courts without undue litigation." 62
II. THE

EMERGING RELIANCE ON FINALITY

During the last decade, a complementary approach to the problem of judicial intervention in ongoing administrative proceedings
has emerged. This approach focuses on the "final agency action"
requirement in the long-ignored 63 section 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).64 This section provides:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not
directly reviewable is subject to review on review of the
final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for
the purposes of this section whether or not there has been
presented or determined an application for a declaratory
order, for any form of reconsiderations, or, unless the
agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the
action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior
agency authority.6 5
Two appellate judges have developed useful frameworks for
the application of section 10(c)'s requirement of "final agency ac61 Id. 330.

62 K. DAvis, ADimIuTIVE LAw oF Tim SvEnvz § 20.00-3 (Supp. 1980).
See
63K. DAviS, AD msn TrvE LAw OF THE SEvENTIEs §20.08 (1976).
also id. § 20.04 (discussing cases which could have been analyzed in terms of
§ 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976), but were

not).

The general judicial review provisions of this
645 U.S.C. §704 (1976).
section may be supplemented or abrogated by the enabling legislation of an
administrative agency.
65 Id. (emphasis added).
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tion." They are Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit and Judge
Leventhal of the District of Columbia Circuit.66
A. Judge Friendly'sApproach
The development of finality analysis in the Second Circuit
began with Pepsico, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.67 In that
case, the FTC had filed a complaint against Pepsico, seeking to
prohibit it from taking certain actions with respect to its bottlers.6 8
Pepsico pleaded as a defense that its 513 bottlers were indispensable
parties to the proceedings and moved to dismiss due to the FTC's
failure to join them. The hearing examiner denied the motion,6 9
and Pepsico filed an interlocutory appeal. When the Commission
affirmed the decision of the examiner, 70 Pepsico brought an action
in district court, seeking to enjoin the FTC from proceeding against
it unless the bottlers were joined. The district court dismissed
72
for lack of jurisdiction.7 1 The court of appeals affirmed.
Judge Friendly, in the opinion for the court of appeals, seemed
to accept that the exhaustion rule was inadequate to bar judicial
review under the circumstances of the case because Pepsico had
exhausted its administrative remedies as to the joinder issue for
which review was sought.73 But to allow review under these
circumstances would have entailed an undesirable interruption of
an ongoing agency proceeding.
Owing to the exhaustion doctrine's shortcomings, Judge
Friendly rejected it as the basis of analysis and focused instead upon
"the crucial issue [of] . . .the proper interpretation of § 10(c)." 74
66

See notes 67-107 infra & accompanying text.
Various other courts have also applied the "final agency action" requirements
of § 10(c). See, e.g., Ideal Basic Indus., Inc. v. Morton, 542 F.2d 1364, 1370
(9th Cir. 1976); Gallo v. Mathews, 538 F.2d 1148, 1151 (5th Cir. 1976); Klein v.
Comm'r of Patents, 474 F.2d 821, 824 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co., 455 F.2d 432, 452 (9th Cir. 1971); Nor-Am
Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151, 1159 (7th Cir. 1970);
Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 1099, 1123-26 (S.D. Fla.),
rev'd on other grounds, 517 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1975).
67472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
68 Id. 182.

69 Id.183.
70 The Commission chose not to treat the matter as a motion for leave to file
an interlocutory appeal. Instead, the Commission treated the question as though
it had been certified to it with the hearing examiner's recommendation. Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. 191.
73 Id. 186 n.7.
74 Id.186. See text accompanying note 124 infra.
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The court dismissed Pepsico's complaint on the merits, 75 but also
found that there had been no "final agency action." 76
Judge Friendly postulated, accepting only "for the sake of
argument," 77 that forms of "final agency action," and hence occasion for judicial intervention in agency proceedings, might exist
when an agency "refuses to dismiss a proceeding that is plainly
beyond its jurisdiction as a matter of law or is being conducted
in a manner that cannot result in a valid order." 78 The reason
for including these two situations within a definition of final agency
action, in Judge Friendly's view, might be derived from Leedom v.
Kyne 79 and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros.80
Judge Friendly suggested in Pepsico that this standard represents a
"possibly over-generous" reading of those cases 81 and noted, in a
subsequent case, that these two situations are "the most that can
be extrapolated from Leedom v. Kyne." 82
The finality approach resurfaced in Ecology Action v. Atomic
Energy Commission.s3 The Atomic Energy Commission issued an
order excluding certain issues from consideration in proceedings
on an application for the construction of a nuclear power plant.8 4
Ecology Action sought review of this order as "final," claiming
that the Commission's exclusionary ruling would render the administrative proceeding incapable of resulting in a valid order,
thus bringing the case within Pepsico's arguably broad grounds
for review.8 The Second Circuit dismissed Ecology Action's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. 6
Judge Friendly, writing for the court, recognized that an administrative order need not be the last possible one to constitute
a "final" order.8 7 He nonetheless rejected Ecology Action's contention that this was a case of final agency action:
75 472 F.2d at 190-91.

761d.187.

77id.
78 Id. (footnote omitted).
79

358 U.S. 184 (1958).

80372 U.S. 10 (1963).

See notes 20-31 supra & accompanying text.
See notes 45-48 supra & acompanying text

81472 F.2d at 187.
82
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Weinberger, 509 F.2d 1236, 1239 (2d Cir. 1975).
In Sterling Drug, Judge Friendly seems to adopt the view that both exceptions to
the exhaustion requirement that he recognized in Pepsico could be extrapolated
from Leedom v. Kyne alone. Id.
83492 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1974).
84 Id. 999.
85 Id. 1001.
s6 Id.1002.
871d. 1000.
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If there is to be an exception [to the rule that such claims
are reviewable only upon ultimate judicial review of an
agency's final order], it should be limited to cases where
the exclusionary ruling is so flagrantly wrong and demonstrably critical as to make it apparent that the agency is
not merely courting the possibility of reversal but is running into the certainty of it if the ultimate decision should
be against the proponent of the evidence. In that exceedingly limited category, the game of bestowing the rubric
of finality on an order which, from an analytical stands8
point, is surely interlocutory, may be worth the candle.
Judge Friendly acknowledged that the application of such a
rule would require some consideration of the merits of the claim.
He contended, however, that an approach affording "a little play
in the joints for judgment" would be preferable to holding that
such exclusionary orders could never constitute "final agency
action." s9
In sum, Judge Friendly's approach would posit administrative
finality, under either section 10(c) of the APA or the judicial review provisions of an agency's enabling statute, as a prerequisite
to judicial intervention in agency proceedings. Judge Friendly's
approach, although initiated by an inquiry into jurisdiction, ultimately renders discretionary the decision whether to review agency
action during a continuing proceeding. Judges less reluctant than
Judge Friendly to intervene in ongoing administrative proceedings
are afforded sufficient discretion, by playing the semantic "game of
bestowing the rubric of finality on an order," 90 to step in at virtually any point to second-guess the challenged agency. Judge
Friendly's focus on "final agency action," however, has been beneficial; his opinions have exposed the inadequacies of using the
exhaustion doctrine alone to assess the appropriateness of judicial
intervention in an ongoing administrative proceeding.
B. Judge Leventhal's Approach
In Association of National Advertisers (ANA) v. Federal Trade
Commission,91 the ANA sought declaratory relief in district court
after FTC Chairman Pertschuk refused-with the Commission's
88

Id. 1001.

89 Id.

90 Id.
90 1980-1 Trade Cas. ff 63098, at 77,461 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 3011 (1980).
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backing-to recuse himself from rulemaking proceedings affecting
the ANA. Plaintiffs claimed that Pertschuk had prejudged the
issues, and for ammunition, they pointed to certain public statements that Pertschuk had made concerning the subject of the rulemaking.92 The district court granted the requested relief.93 On
appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's
order.9 4 But the circuit court did not think its immediate review
of the challenge to Chairman Pertschuk's participation was barred
by the exhaustion doctrine. 95
Judge Leventhal, concurring in the judgment, focused upon
the "jurisdictional difficulty [that] arises out of the requirement
of finality" 96 under section 10(c). He suggested that this section
requires "more than exhaustion of administrative remedies, [in
that] it also requires a final agency action." 97 In his view this
requirement constituted a "general denial of jurisdiction" 98 in
courts to interfere prior to final agency action.
Judge Leventhal offered two narrow exceptions to this jurisdictional barrier. The first, in complete conformity with Leedom
v. Kyne, would allow judicial intervention when an agency had
"clearly violated an express statutory prohibition." 99 The second
exception to the finality requirement would obtain when the agency
commits a "violation of basic rights established by a structuralflaw,
and not requiring in any way a consideration of interrelated aspects
of the merits." 100 Except for these exceptions, "[a] court must
disclaim jurisdiction notwithstanding the claim that action already
taken realistically means that the ongoing proceeding will be waste
motion and will have to be done over again." 101
Judge Leventhal also suggested that a court faced with a party
seeking relief for "a claim of prejudice or bias alleged to infect an
92 Id. 77,477 n.56.

93 Id. 77,463.
94 Id. 77,478.
95 Id. 77,478. In the court's opinion, the ANA case fell within an exception to
the usual requirement of exhaustion because there were no disputed factual issues
that would demand the creation of a better administrative record, and the issue
involved in the case was "a pure question of law." Id. 77,463-64.
96 Id. 77,481 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
97Id.

98 Id.
99 Id. 77,483.
100 Id. Although unclear from the opinion, the term "structural flaw" appears
to mean uncontested facts about agency procedures that impugn the basic fairness
of the proceedings. See, for instance, Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260
(D.C. Cir. 1962), in which the court of appeals held that the district court had
jurisdiction to hear a claim based solely on due process grounds.
101 1980-1 Trade Cas. 1 63098, at 77,481-82 (emphasis added).
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agency proceeding at its core" 102 may assume jurisdiction by considering the matter "on application for a writ of mandamus . . .
with jurisdiction predicated on the All-Writs Act." 10
Judge
Leventhal seemed to accept that this jurisdiction would be reserved
for "exceptional circumstances," 104 and cautioned that "it by no
means follows [from his analogy to mandamus] that a court has
jurisdiction to intervene in an ongoing administrative proceeding."'105 If jurisdiction predicated on the All-Writs Act does exist,
Judge Leventhal would limit such jurisdiction over Federal Trade
Commission matters to the federal appellate courts. 06
In the judge's judgment, judicial intervention prior to finality
was not justified in Association of National Advertisers.10 7 The
claim of bias involved in the case did not constitute a "structural
flaw" because the ascertainment of bias in a person not in a position
from which the probability of bias can be easily inferred would
involve extensive factfinding. Such factfinding, according to Judge
Leventhal, should be conducted only on review of final orders.
Judge Leventhal's theory of final agency action would limit,
to a greater degree than does Judge Friendly's, the extent of judicial discretion in determining whether or not to intervene in ongoing agency proceedings. Unless a case falls within either of
Judge Leventhal's exceptions, a court would lack jurisdiction over
it, unable to intervene until final agency action occurs. The principal advantage of this jurisdictional approach is to reduce the
number of occasions on which a court would be able to-or a litigant tempted to-circumvent the established procedures of an
agency. The smooth functioning of this approach depends, however, upon a workable definition of "final action." This Comment
takes up that question in part III. First, though, it is necessary
to discuss further the jurisdictional interpretation of section 10(c).
C. Section 10(c) as Limiting Jurisdiction
Judge Leventhal's interpretation of section 10(c) as a limit
upon the jurisdiction of the federal courts to review administrative
agency actions finds little, if any support in the legislative history
102 Id. 77,482.
103 Id.; All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
104 1980-1 Trade Cas. 7 63098, at 77,482 (citing Action Realty Co. v. Will,

427 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1970) and Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958)).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. 77,483.
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of that section. Although Congress clearly possesses the power to
so restrict the jurisdiction of the courts, 0 s the little authority going
to the point, while suggesting that the drafters of the APA regarded
section 10 (c) as merely a codification of the existing law of exhaustion, is inconclusive. 10 9 Several reasons nonetheless commend
Judge Leventhal's interpretation of finality.
First, the mere fact that section 10(c) may have codified the
exhaustion doctrine alters the discretionary nature of the requirement."10 The Ninth Circuit has adopted the argument that "when
exhaustion is statutorily mandated, the exhaustion requirement is
jurisdictional." 11 This interpretation harmonizes well with the
fact that the APA is a statute of general application, whose requirements can be avoided by the particular mandates of an agency's
enabling legislation."12 Finding section 10(c) finality a jurisdictional prerequisite, therefore, would not impose the requirement
across the spectrum of administrative law. Congress could relax
the requirement in particular instances.
Second, the structure of section 10(c) itself argues for a jurisdictional interpretation. The statute delineates three classes of
agency action: "action made reviewable by statute," "final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,"
and "preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or
108 See, e.g., Fillinger v. Cleveland Socy for the Blind, 591 F.2d 378, 379
(6th Cir. 1979) ("Congress can make exhaustion of administrative remedies an
absolute prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction."). See also City of Tacoma v.
Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 336 (1958) ("Congress, acting within its
constitutional powers, may prescribe the procedures and conditions under which,
and the courts in which, judicial review of administrative orders may be had.").
0
1 9 SENATE JUDcIAcRy Commrrrn
Tr (June 1945), reprinted in ADnmsTIATrvE PocEDuRE Acr-LE sr.TvE HisToRY-79TH CONG., 1944-46, at 11, 37
(1946) [hereinafter cited as APA LEGIs. isT.]; Letter from Tom C. Clark, Attorney
General, to Hon. Pat McCarran, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Oct. 19, 1945)
(appendix), reprinted in APA L.cis. His., supra, at 230; see Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979). Cf. Malone Freight Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 204 F. Supp. 745, 752 (N.D. Ala. 1962) (§10(c) of the APA "represents an
effort on the part of Congress to resolve complexities of pre-existing decisional law
dealing with the exhaustion problem").
110See, e.g., Neely v. United States, 285 F.2d 438, 443 (Ct. Cl. 1961)
("Unless made a prerequisiteto suit by statute, ... the extent to which a plaintiff
is required to pursue his administrative remedy is a matter for the discretion of
the court.") (emphasis added). See also American Dairy of Evansville, Inc. v.
Bergland, 48 Ad. L.2d 197, 212, 218-25 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Robinson, J.,dissenting) (arguing that incorporation of exhaustion doctrine in § 8(15) (A) of the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act made exhaustion a jurisdictional prerequisite).
"'1Eluska v. Andrus, 587 F.2d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 1978). See Montgomery
v. Rumsfield, 572 F.2d 250, 252-53 (9th Cir. 1978). See generally Fuchs, supra
note 1, at 867; Comment, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies as a Prerequisite
to Judicial Review, 44 Mict. L. REv. 1035, 1041-42 (1946).
112Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 93 (1947).
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ruling[s] not directly reviewable." 113 Only the first two classes of
action are "subject to judicial review." 114 It follows, therefore,
that any actions not final or otherwise reviewable by statute are
simply not reviewable. That is, the courts have no jurisdiction
over nonfinal cases. It makes no sense to draft a statute categorizing agency action in terms of reviewability without implicitly denying jurisdiction over actions termed "not directly reviewable."
Furthermore, the last sentence of section 10(c), shifting agency
actions that would be final but for the possibility of further intraagency appeal or reconsideration to a reviewable status," 5 makes
sense only if nonfinal actions are not reviewable by the courts.
Third, the Supreme Court has flatly stated that an agency
action "is subject to judicial review ...

only if the [action] ... was

'final agency action' or otherwise was 'directly reviewable' under
§ 10(c) of the APA." 116 This can mean only that finality is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review. Although the Supreme Court has also held that section 10(c) does not grant the
federal courts an independent ground for assuming subject matter
jurisdiction, 117 whether section 10(c) can validly restrict federal
court jurisdiction is a different question. Even though an agency
action may be final, a court must find an independent ground for
jurisdiction, such as section 1331 of title 28.118 Section 10(c) purports only to prevent a premature assumption of jurisdiction.
A jurisdictional interpretation of section 10(c)-absolutely
barring judicial review absent a finding of finality-seems, therefore, to be justified by logic and by recent holdings of the Supreme
Court. Additionally, such an interpretation has the advantage of
providing a relatively clear-cut threshold requirement for judicial
review, thereby forestalling potentially abusive intervention.
III.

"FINAL

AGENCY ACTION"

UNDER THE

APA

A. Focusingon Effects
The preceding section attempted to establish that section 10(c)
of the APA is properly read as a limitation upon a federal court's
113 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).
114 Id.

Id.
116 FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 49 U.S.L.W. 4054, 4055 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1980)
(No. 79-900) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
117 Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
11828 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (granting federal-question jurisdiction to federal
115

district courts).
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jurisdiction to review administrative agency action. This limitation removes a court's discretion to review unless the agency action
is otherwise reviewable by statute or constitutes final action for
which no other remedy is available. 1 9 The crucial question, then,
becomes how to define when an agency action has become final
within the meaning of section 10(c). The ensuing discussion proposes a partial theory for defining "final agency action" in a manner that will comport with the need to preserve the integrity of
the administrative process and still allow the courts jurisdiction
to review agency action in appropriate cases.
The term "agency action" is defined in the APA as "the whole
or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 120 "Finality,"
however, finds no similar definition, although it is ultimately the
most critical term. For if "finality" under section 10(c) entails a
large element of judicial discretion or provides courts with no
clear standard to apply, the failings of the exhaustion doctrine will
survive a transition to a finality analysis. The courts' jurisdiction
to review would simply depend upon ad hoc determinations of
whether an action is "final."
The legislative history of section 10 (c) supports a narrow
construction of the term "final agency action" and suggests how to
interpret it in practice. The Senate report to the Act states that
"[fJinal action includes any effective agency action for which there
is no other adequate remedy in any court."

121

The House report

also speaks of final agency action, describing it as "effective or
operative." 122 Although neither report further clarifies when an
agency action is final, the apparent focus is upon the effects or
results of agency action. In other words, the nature of an actionwhether it is final or not- is determined in light of the nature of
the effects of that action. The difficulty is that virtually any action
taken by an agency will in some sense have effects, but not all
actions, of course, can be final. So "effective or operative" action,
to be final, must have results that are somehow different from the
1195

U.S.C. § 704 (1976).

For full text of § 10(c), see text accompanying

note 65 supra.
120Administrative Procedure Act, §2(g), 5 U.S.C. §551(13)
phasis added).

(1976)

(em-

121 S.RP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), reprinted in APA LEGIs.
HisT., supra note 109, at 213 (emphasis added).
122 H.1L Pm'. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in APA
His., supra note 109, at 277.
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effects of nonfinal agency action. The articulation of that difference is the crux of any finality analysis.
Some light is cast by a progenitor of section 10(c), section
311(d) of a model bill proposed by a minority report from the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. This
model bill proposed that: "Administrative orders, declaratory or
'otherwise, directing action, assessing penalties, prohibiting conduct,
,or denying claimed rights, privileges or benefits under the Constitution or statutes shall be subject to . . . [judicial] review." 123 The

concern seemed to be that parties should be free to seek review
of actions that have some immediate, legal effects that are external
to the administrative proceeding itself. That is, review was to be
permitted only when the challenged action had some demonstrable impact upon the parties that was not simply procedural or
agency housekeeping.
In Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC, Judge Friendly formulated the issue
thus:
The real question is under what circumstances a court
should review an order which, in Mr. Justice Brandeis'
famous phrase, "does not command the [party] . . .to do,

or to refrain from doing any thing; which does not grant
or withhold any authority, privilege, abridge any power
or facility; which does not subject the [party] . . . to any

liability, civil or criminal; which does not change the
[party's] . . .existing or future status or condition; which

does not determine any right or obligation."

124

And in a recent decision of the Second Circuit, Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Johnson,125 the court said that "the finality
requirement [under section 10(c)] is to be interpreted in 'a prag123

FhnAL

REPORT OF THE

ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S

COMmiTTEE ON AD.MnT'SThA-

246 (1942). The remainder of the proposed subsection reads
much like what ultimately was enacted as section 10(c):
TIrE

PROCEDURE

Provided, however, That only final orders, or orders for which there is no
other adequate judicial remedy, shall be subject to such review. Preliminary or intermediate orders, so far as the same are by law reviewable,
shall be subject to review upon the review of final orders. An order shall
be final for purposes of such review notwithstanding that no petition for
rehearing or reconsideration has been presented to the administrative
authority involved.

Id.
124 472 F.2d 179, 186 n.7 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting United States v. Los
Angeles & S.L.R.R., 273 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1927)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876
(1973).
125 629 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1980).
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matic way,' "126 and that "in determining finality we must decide
'whether the process of administrative decisionmaking has reached
a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process
of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences flow from the agency action."'"1 27
Under this rule, the court of appeals refused to find that the "issuance of a report recommending a further study of [a New York
water project could] . . . possibly be characterized as a 'final agency
action' within the meaning of section 10 (c) of the APA." 128 Specifically, the report did "not recommend the construction of the
[project] . . . , nor [did] it advocate any other definitive action
with respect to the project." 129 Evidently, the report in question
did not have enough impact upon conditions outside the administrative process to be classified as final action. Again, the finality
analysis centered on the effects of the challenged action.
In an even more recent decision, FTC v. Standard Oil Company of California (Socal),130 the Supreme Court held that
"[b]ecause the [FTC]'s issuance of a complaint averring reason to
believe that Socal has violated the [Federal Trade Commission]
Act is not 'final agency action' under § 10(c) of the APA, it is not
judicially reviewable before administrative adjudication concludes." 131 In so holding, the Court enunciated the factors that
determine when an agency action becomes final by referring to its
opinion in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.132 In Abbott, the
publication by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs of regulations that required drug manufacturers to include certain information on labels and advertisements was held to be reviewable final
agency action. But the Socal Court distinguished Abbott on the
facts, finding that the FTC's complaint had "had no legal force
or practical effect upon Socal's daily business other than the disruptions that accompany any major litigation." 133 Abbott, in
contrast, involved regulations that "were 'definitive' statements of
the Commission's position, . . . and [that] had a 'direct and im1261d. 241 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149
(1967)).
127 Id. (quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktierbolaget
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970) (emphasis added).
128 Id.
329 Id.
130 FTC v. Standard Oil Company of California, 49 U.S.L.W. 4054 (U.S. Dec.
15, 1980) (No. 79-900).
131 Id. 4057 (footnote omitted).
132387 U.S. 136 (1967).
133

Socal, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4056.
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* * effect on the day-to-day business' of the complaining

parties." 134 The complaint in Socal, however, "[served] only to
initiate the proceedings," said the Court. 135
The Court's juxtaposition of agency actions having "direct and
immediate . . . effects on the day-to-day business" of the litigants
against those having only procedural consequences reveals a great
deal about the fundamental concerns of any finality analysis. Apparently, the Court wishes to prevent intervention into those agency
actions having effects internal to the administrative process-such
as procedural decisions-while reserving intervention for those occasions when the action impacts upon matters external to the
process. The rationale for so limiting judicial intervention bears
a close resemblance to the reasons articulated in McKart v. United
States '" for requiring exhaustion. 137 But as the Court itself
noted, 13 exhaustion and finality are not strictly congruent; rather,
the two rules serve the same end by different means.
The next section of the Comment will attempt to formulate
a theory, deriving from the factors just discussed, that defines
finality in a manner that will be truer to the interest of administrative independence than the exhaustion doctrine has proven to be.
B. A Theory of Finality
Although incapable of absolutely unambiguous definition,
finality appears to occur when the effects of agency action are both
the direct consequence of that action and, in some sense, external
to the administrative process. Admittedly, no court has expressed
the predicates for finality in precisely this way, but as the
Socal decision suggests, 139 a theory of finality along these lines
isolates the essential factors relied upon by the courts in defining
final agency action. The advantage of such a theory is that it
articulates two relatively clear indicia telling the courts when to
intervene in ongoing agency proceedings. In particular, the proposed theory would enable courts to make their determinations
based upon relatively minor incursions into, and without substantial delays of, agency proceedings. Perhaps in most cases the decision could be made upon the pleadings.
134

Id. (citation omitted).

135 Id.

136395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969).
137 See notes 9-15 supra & accompanying text.

138 Socal, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4057.
39

See text accompanying notes 133-37 supra.

1980]

LIMITING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

1. Direct and External Effects
The direct effects of agency action, as they are defined here,
are those that are the immediate and intended results of the particular proceeding from which they issue. They relate to the purpose for which the administrative proceeding was begun. "Intended" does not here refer to the subjective intent of any actor or
official, but rather to the intent of the proceeding, in terms of the
reasons for its having been initiated. For example, to take a
simple case, rulemaking is the direct effect of a rulemaking proceeding because such a proceeding is intended to produce rules.
Direct effects, however, are not necessarily the sole outcome of
agency action, nor are they always related to the central purpose
of the proceeding. Rather, any given proceeding may produce
several different direct effects, at different stages of the proceeding,
and for different reasons. The idea here is that certain effects are
direct because they are what the agency was trying or was supposed
to do. They are not results that were either unforeseen or unintended. And it is presumed that an agency cannot intend by its
action results that it had neither power nor interest in achieving.
Direct effects, however, may have the kind of impact upon parties
or conditions that we wish to see reviewed.
But directness is only half the equation. In order to ensure
that proceedings are interrupted only when they produce final
action, another factor must be introduced. Some agency actions
having direct effects nonetheless do not impact upon anything
other than the course of the proceeding itself. If it is important
not to disrupt the orderly progress of administrative action, then
we do not want to second-guess an agency in decisions bearing only
upon matters internal to the process. Reviewable actions, therefore, are those that have effects "external" to the administrative
proceeding. It is precisely this kind of external effect that, to paraphrase Justice Brandeis, 140 commands a party to do, or to refrain
from doing, something; that grants or withholds authority; that
subjects a party to any liability; that changes a party's existing or
future status or condition; that determines any right or obligation.
In each of these situations, a decision has been made that will impact upon someone or something other than the conduct or course
of the proceeding itself. Procedural rules, for instance, relate to
and impact upon the proceedings themselves. They are internal to
the administrative process. Calling back an earlier example, rule140

See note 124 supra & accompanying text.
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making is an action with external effects, for that is the very purpose of the action: to have an effect upon the world outside of the
administrative process.
Directness and externality overlap in the determination of
finality. Obviously, any action can have multiple effects; some direct, some not, some external, some not. By looking to both variables, however, one can determine whether a particular action is
final. Under the theory proposed here, finality occurs when an
action is both direct and external. If the action has effects that
are its immediate and intended result and that operate upon events,
conditions, persons, or things separate from the proceeding itself,
then that action should be considered final under section 10 (c).
As an illustration, take the suspension by the Securities Exchange Commission of a securities broker's Regulation A exemption,141 pending further administrative proceedings. Such an action,
under the foregoing analysis, would be classified as final, and therefore, subject to immediate judicial review because it has an effect
that is both direct and external. The suspension of the broker's
exemption is clearly the immediate and intended result of the
action-that was precisely what the Commission was trying to doand it is also a result bearing on conditions outside the proceeding-it did not concern the manner in which the proceeding was
conducted.
Certain other agency actions would clearly not be final under
this test. A decision to hold public hearings in City A as opposed
to City B, for instance, would not be final.1 42 Although the immediate-or direct-effect of the decision is that the hearings will
take place in City A, those effects are internal to the agency procedure; they pertain to the way in which the agency chooses to
carry out its own functions. The same conclusion-that the action
is not final-would obtain even if an effect of the location decision
were to inconvenience greatly certain parties to the proceeding. In
that case, although that effect might be considered external to the
proceeding-in that it impacts upon matters outside the agency4'See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264

(Regulation A).

Section 230.252 exempts

certain securities from certain registration requirements under the federal securities
laws. Section 230.261 provides for the suspension of this exemption under certain
circumstances.
142

See, e.g., Eastern Utilities Assocs. v. SEC, 162 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1947)

(holding in the course of affrance of dismissal of plaintiff's petition to review an
SEC order denying his motion to hold an agency proceeding in Boston instead of
Philadelphia that preliminary or procedural orders of an administrative body are not
directly subject to judicial review).
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that effect was not the immediate and intended result of the
agency action. Such effects are merely ancillary or indirect consequences of the primary purpose of the action.
Virtually every agency action can be analyzed in this way. Any
agency action can be classified as having results that are either direct
and external, direct and internal, indirect (or ancillary) and external, and/or indirect (or ancillary) and internal. Only the first
type of action will warrant immediate judicial review. Only that
type of action will enable a court to find finality and assume jurisdiction.
Any particular action may have several types of effects. But,
accepting the preceding analysis, the courts are entitled to assume
jurisdiction over a case only when one or more of the effects can
be classified as direct and external. Once having assumed jurisdiction over a case, however, a court cannot be denied the opportunity
to examine every other issue in the case. 143 The analysis offered
here acts merely as a threshold requirement to a finding of jurisdiction to review an ongoing proceeding. Of course, the courts
will still retain the discretionary power, under the exhaustion doctrine, to refuse to hear a case over which it has jurisdiction.
To recapitulate, the analysis presented here focuses upon the
effects of agency action in determining finality. If any of the
effects of a particular action are both direct and external, then
the action is final. If it is final, the court may assume jurisdiction,
even though the proceeding as such has not concluded. Conversely, if the challenged action has no effects that are both direct
and external, then the action is not final and review must be denied for lack of jurisdiction.
The advantage of this scheme is that it substantially reduces
the judicial discretion inherent in the exhaustion doctrine by creating relatively definite and objective indicia for determining when
an agency has made a final action. At the same time, it frees the
courts to review agency actions that might have untoward and irremediable effects upon matters in the "outside world." By reducing discretion and providing clarity, a finality approach should
have the additional salutary effect of discouraging attempts to bypass agency procedures for the perceived more sympathetic judicial
forum.
143 Section 10(c) itself states that "[a] preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on review of

the final agency action." See also Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720, 723 (2d Cir.
1949); notes 32 & 33 supra & accompanying text.
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2. Mandamus Jurisdiction
The concern of section 10 (c)'s finality requirement is to prevent the disruption of ongoing agency proceedings. 1'
Shifting to
the finality analysis described above would necessarily reduce the
applicability of a number of the exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine canvassed earlier.'4 5 Cases in which the courts may insistperhaps justifiably-on reviewing agency actions that are clearly nonfinal, however, pose a significant problem. Presumably, the courts
would not have developed exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine
had they not felt that some form of judicial intervention into agency
proceedings is at times appropriate, and that therefore, some "play
[must exist] in the joints" of the doctrine. 14 6 Indeed, notions of
the balance and separation of administrative and judicial powers
comport with such exception-making. The difficulty with the exhaustion doctrine, however, has been that the exceptions threaten
to swallow the rule, at least in principle. The task of this section
of this Comment is to suggest how the felt need to provide flexibility can be reconciled with the relatively rigid and narrow
finality requirement.
The exception introduced by Leedom v. Kyne, 147 for example,
illustrates well the desirability of retaining some opportunities for
judicial review of technically nonfinal agency action. In the Leedom case, the National Labor Relations Board had, by its own
admission, ignored a statutory prerequisite to a disputed certification election; the potential consequences for the complaining union
of a court's refusal to accept jurisdiction would have been a loss
148
of exclusive bargaining rights, without any other legal recourse.
Prospects such as this may have influenced Judge Friendly, in
Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC,4 9 to expand the notion of finality to encompass clear statutory violations despite the absence of strictly final
agency action. 50 Judge Leventhal's concurrence in Association of
National Advertisers v. FTC,151 however, suggests a more attractive
alternative. Judge Leventhal predicated the court's jurisdiction
14 4 See notes 88, 96-107 and 125-35 supra & accompanying texts.

145 See notes 16-62 supra & accompanying text.
146 See note 89 supra & accompanying text.

v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 192 (1958).
148 Id. 184-87, 190. See note 22 supra.
149 472 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
15 0 See text accompanying notes 67-90 supra.
-151980-1 Trade Cas. ff 63,098, at 77,461 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied,

147Leedom

100 S. Ct. 301 (1980).

See notes 91-107 supra & accompanying text.
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on the All-Writs Act,1 52 a statute that has traditionally permitted
interlocutory judicial review in "extraordinary cases." 153
According to Judge Leventhal, review of agency action under
the All-Writs Act is reserved to the courts of appeals,'5 4 but similar
extraordinary power in the district courts can be found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361, granting district court jurisdiction over actions "in the nature of mandamus." 155 Such extraordinary power could be utilized
by the district courts to preserve the narrow Leedom exception.
Allowing review of nonfinal action under the mandamus statute marshalls against indiscreet judicial intervention a long-standing tradition of issuing writs of mandamus only in "the most urgent
cases" 15 and a stringent set of conditions that a party seeking a
writ of mandamus must meet. For example, in the Second Circuit,
"[t]he prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of mandamus have
been stated as (I) a clear right in the plaintiff to the relief sought;
(2) a plainly defined and peremptory duty on the defendant's part
to do the act in question; and (3) lack of another available, adequate remedy." 157 These conditions, carried over from the original
writ of mandamus, uniformly attach in all circuits to the availability of relief under section 1361.158 The obstacles to invoking
15228 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). This section provides:
(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge
of a court which has jurisdiction.
153 1980-1 Trade Cas. at 77,482 (Leventhal, J.,concurring) (citing Mitchell
v. Sirica, 502 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 955 (1974)).
154 Id.

15528 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976). It states: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an offlcer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to
the plaintiff."
156 Strait v. Laird, 445 F.2d 843, 844 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds,
406 U.S. 341 (1972). See Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (mandamus
reserved for "really extraordinary causes").
15 TBilliteri v. United States, 541 F.2d 938, 946 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing United
States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 543-44 (1937) and

Lovallo v. Froehlke, 468 F.2d 340, 343 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 918
(1973)).
158 See, e.g., Haneke v. Secretary of HEW, 535 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Commonwealth of Mass. v. Connor, 248 F. Supp. 656
(D. Mass.), aff'd, 366

F.2d 778 (1st Cir. 1966); Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir.
1972), reo'd on other grounds, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Professional & Tech. Eng'rs
Local 1 v. Williams, 389 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 966 (4th

Cir. 1975); Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 941
(1969); United States v. Battisti, 486 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1973); Save the Dunes

Council v. Alexander, 584 F.2d 158 (7th Cir. 1978); In re Cessna Distributorship Antitrust Litigation, 532 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1976); Ellis v. Naval Air Rework
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jurisdiction under section 1361 are thus sufficiently high that few
exceptions to finality will be allowed by the section. 159
Section 1361 jurisdiction would have been appropriate in
Leedom: a nondiscretionary statutory duty owed to the complainant
union had been breached and the union had no alternative remedy.
Similarly, an agency's violation of a statutory duty to act "within
a reasonable time," although not constituting final action, 1 0
would be reviewable under section 1361. The "futility" exception':' to the exhaustion doctrine would also be an exception to
finality when the conditions upon mandamus are met. The same
162
holds for the extremely narrow international-questions exception.
Some other exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, however,
would not survive the transition to finality. It is not enough under
section 1361, for instance, to present a colorable constitutional
claim. Even under the "substantial showing" requirement, 163 section 1361 further requires that no other remedy be available. A
due process claim against agency proceedings, cognizable upon some
final agency action, would, therefore, not be reviewable before
finality. In addition, the legal questions exception' 4 would in
most cases probably be inapplicable owing either to the availability
of adequate administrative remedies or to the adequacy of judicial
review at a later stage.
The advantage of recognizing exceptions to finality only insofar as they are cognizable under section 1361 is that the jurisdictional interpretation of section 10(c) is left tightly constrained and
easily applicable, and that discretionary judicial action is subject
to the tempering influences of the mandamus doctrine. As a consequence of the reduction of judicial discretion to intervene in
ongoing agency proceedings, the number of cases in which parties
Facility, 404 F. Supp. 377 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Schulke v. United States, 544 F.2d

433 (10th Cir. 1976). See also Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S.
394 (1976) (identical constraints on mandamus from courts of appeals to district
courts ).
159 For a general discussion of the § 1361 remedy and support for a narrow
interpretation of the statute, see 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTiCE f 0.62[17] (2d
ed. 1979). But cf. Michigan Head Start Directors Ass'n v. Butz, 397 F. Supp.
1124 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (legislative history shows that Congress intended to enlarge scope of mandamus in enacting § 1361); Kelly v. Metropolitan County Board
of Educ., 372 F. Supp. 528 (D. Tenn. 1973) (same).
160 See, e.g., Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978);
Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 865 (4th Cir. 1961).
1
'6 See notes 42-44 supra & accompanying text.
162

See notes 45-48 supra & accompanying text.

163 See text accompanying notes 32-41 supra.
164

See notes 49 & 50 supra & accompanying text.

1980]

LIMITING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION

to agency proceedings seek to skirt administrative procedures and
invoke the district courts' jurisdiction should decline.165 Finally,
this narrow approach to the determination of finality appears to
be consistent with both the legislative history and language of
section 10 (c).
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies-longfavored as a means of preventing undue judicial interference with
the administrative process-has evolved to the point at which it
can no longer satisfy the purposes for which it was developed. Its
many ambiguous and amorphous exceptions threaten to undermine
the efficacy and authority of administrative agencies, if not by outright judicial reversals, then by encouraging disgruntled litigants
to attempt to by-pass administrative procedures. In order to prevent this erosion of administrative integrity and to stem the flow
of plaintiffs seeking judicial intervention, this Comment has proposed using section 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act as a
bar against district court jurisdiction when an agency has not
taken "final action." Final action, according to the proposed
analysis, would occur only in those instances when an agency's
action has both direct and external effects. A preliminary theory,
explaining the concept of direct and external effects, has been
offered, with the suggestion that flexibility be introduced into such
a scheme through the use of the section 1361 jurisdiction of the
federal district courts. The adoption of such an approach, it has
been argued, would substantially prevent the abuses to which the
exhaustion doctrine has been subject.
165 "The retention of discretion in the application of the [exhaustion] rule
constitutes a continuing invitation to litigation. It is this factor, more than any
Berger, supra note
other, which has resulted in an incrustation of case-law ......
1, at 1006.

